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Abstract 
A general theory of incentive-based policy under risk and asymmetric information 
is developed. Conditions are derived for when separate policies for producer groups are 
needed, and when a single policy is sufficient. These conditions have implications for the 
feasibility and cost of such incentive based programs in specific regions. 
-
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Formulating policies to regulate environmental damage from agricultural production has 
proved difficult. Recent advances in biophysical transport models have improved our ability to 
predict the movement of agricultural chemical residues, but we still know little about the extent 
and geographic distribution of agricultural contamination across major regions, within specific 
production areas, or across farms. The data requirements for such investigations are substantial. 
Policy analysts are beginning to recognize the importance of this spatial diversity. 
Helfand and House conclude, "The possible cost of using uniform instruments in nonuniform 
conditions could be quite high; on the other hand, the cost of using nonuniform instruments, in 
terms of monitoring and enforcement costs, could also be quite high" (p.l 031). Since farmers 
know much more about their land and other resource situations than do even the local policy 
makers or program administrators (asymmetric information), the challenge is to design creative 
policies which recognize this fact to accomplish environmental goals at minimum social cost. 
Wu and Babcock propose incentive-based "green" payments for farmers to adopt 
environmentally sound production practices. Separate policies and payments account for 
different resource situations. The policy maximizes social welfare assuming that net returns and 
environmental damage are known; the unknown social cost of pollution is set at arbitrary levels. 
This paper develops a general theory of incentive-based policy under asymmetric 
information which recognizes price and yield risk and embodies a standards approach to policy, 
articulated as a chance constraint limiting the probability of severe environmental damage 
• (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1988; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Zhu et ai., 1994). Conditions are 
derived for when separate policies are needed to account for different resource situations and 
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when a single policy is sufficient. These conditions depend on the relative productivity and 
pollution potential of the resources and are independent of fanners' specific risk preferences. An 
empirical application providing incentives to reduce fertilizer application on corn production in 
New York is used to illustrate the theoretical results, estimate government cost from the 
asymmetric infonnation, and analyze the effect of risk on size of payments. 
Theoretical Model 
With no loss in generality, consider two groups of fanners (i=1,2) producing corn using 
nitrogen fertilizer; land differs by group, both by productivity and nitrate contamination potential. 
To control nitrate contamination, the government regulates fertilizer application. affecting net 
returns. Fanners are assumed risk averse, with increasing and strictly concave utility functions 
Ui. Following Collender and Chalfant, we define preferences on empirical distributions of net 
returns, based on observations of weather and prices over T years. Each observation is net 
returns if the weather and price conditions in year t were realized (t= 1,2,... ,T): 
WI is a vector of weather variables in year t, PI and rl are corn and nitrogen fertilizer prices in year 
t, / is the per acre production function for group i (assumed twice differentiable and strictly 
concave), Ni is nitrogen fertilizer application for group i, and V is non-nitrogen variable cost. 
Toward deriving the tradeoffs between reductions in nitrogen fertilizer and compensation, 
let Si be per-acre government payments to group i producers. Then, mean utility for group i is: 
•
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PROPOSITION 1: The function iii (N j ,S;) possesses the following properties: (a) strictly 
By property (b) and the expected utility hypothesis, farmers' pre-policy decision problems are: 
(3) max ii; (N; ,0) , subject to N; ~ 0 (Si =0, reflecting no government payments). 
N i 
By (a) unique solutions exist; let N iG be group i's optimal pre-policy nitrogen fertilizer level. 
The "green" payment policy requires nitrogen rates for which leaching and runoff by 
group i, L i = t(N;,W,C;). satisfy environmental standards, where C; are soil characteristics. 
Leaching is random because it depends on W; N i satisfies the environmental standard, (L*,a) if: 
(4) Pr[ t(Ni, W, C;»L*]:::;; a,
 
where a is the significance level. To design this policy, the government must solve the problem:
 
(5) 
subject to: (E;) 
Ii (Nl' SI) ~ iiI (N jO,0), (p}) 
ii2(N2' S2) ~ u2(Ng ,0), (P2) 
iiI (Nl'Sj) ~ ul (N2,S2)' (I}) 
u2(N2,S2) ~ u2(N I ,SI)' (h) 
where Ai is the number of acres of com in group i, and N/ is the maximum N i that meets the 
environmental standard. The government minimizes the cost of ensuring that environmental 
damage exceeds L* with probability a or less (constraints (Ei)). Program payments S) and S2 
must be set so that producers in both groups are willing to participate in the program (constraints 
• 
(Pi)), and have no incentive to select a policy designed for the other group (constraints (I;)). 
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For a solution to exist, iii must satisfy the "single-crossing property"; one of the groups 
must always need more compensation for the same reduction in nitrogen fertilizer. Equivalently: 
_ dS I = ii~(N,S) iiMN,S) =_dS I \-I(N S) m 2(6) 
- 2 > I - , v , E .J\+. 
dN ;,2 iiS (N,S) us(N,S) dN ;,' 
ii~ and Ii; are partial derivatives of iii w.r.t. Nand S. See figures I and 2 where the level set of 
ii2 is steeper than that of iiI. Expanding the derivatives of iii from equation (2), equation (6) is: 
T	 T 
T-ILU~ (Rt2 (N) + S)· R;' (N) T-ILu;(Ri (N) + S)· Rt~ (N) 
t-l	 > _--,t~-,-l ------­(7)	 T T 
T-ILU; (Rt2 (N) + S) T-ILu;(Ri (N) + S) 
t=l	 t=1 
RitN is the partial derivative of Rit W.r.t. N. Rearranging, condition (7) is: 
T T 
(8) L L u;(Rt l (N) + S)u; (R; (N) + S)[R;N (N) - Rt~ (N)] > 0, 
t=1 5=1 
requiring in all possible pairs of years, 'on average', the marginal value product of group 2 is 
larger than for group I, when the difference is weighted by the derivative of Ui at the respective 
net returns. Proposition 2 relates this condition to yield functions / (proof in appendix). 
ay 2 (N ,W) ay 1 (N ,W) II N W) h . I' ..PROPOSITION 2: If > , a (, , t e smg e crossmg property IS satzsjied.aN aN 
If group 2's marginal product of nitrogen is higher at every fertilization level and for all weather 
conditions, the average of marginal returns across years of observed weather will also be higher. 
With this result, the optimal "green" payments depend on relationships between land 
productivity and initial fertilization levels. In reality, the relationships are an empirical question. 
• 
We assume initial conditions, but highlight the implications when the conditions are otherwise. 
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a 2 (N W) a I (N W) 
CONDITION 1: y aN' > y aN' ; CONDITION 2: Ng > N 1o; CONDITION 3: 0 $, N/$, Nt 
By Proposition 2, condition 1 is sufficient for the single crossing property to hold. Condition 2 is 
for simplicity; it is sufficient but not necessary for what follows. Condition 3 means producers 
decrease fertilization rates to meet environmental standards, ruling out uninteresting cases. Since 
we do not know a priori which group must fertilize at a lower rate to satisfy environmental 
standards, we must consider two cases: N; $, N;, and N] *<N2* . 
PROPOSITION 3: The constraints (E2) and (P2) will bind in the optimal policy for group 2. 
This result is verified graphically. Figures lea) and l(b) represent the cases N; $, N; and 
N] *<N2*; (E2) and (P2) are satisfied in the region aA*b in both figures. Suppose, contrary to the 
claim, an optimal policy for group 2 is chosen where (E2) and (P2) are slack, at a points such as A 
in both figures. To satisfy (I]), (h), and (E]), group 1's policy must lie in regions cAd. Consider 
now offering group 2 the policy A', which also satisfies (P2) and (E2), but with strictly lower 
payments. Associated with A' there is a group 1 policy B' which satisfies (I]), (h), and (E]), with 
lower payments than in regions cAd. Therefore, if (P2) and (E2) do not bind, the solution cannot 
be optimal, since another feasible policy has strictly lower government cost. 
PROPOSITION 4: IfN; $, N;, group 1 will share group 2 's policy; ifN/<N/, group 1 will have 
a separate policy, with the constraints (/]) and (E]) binding, and (p]) nonbinding. 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) represent the two cases; the feasible sets that satisfy the remaining 
constraints (1]), (h), and (E]) are regions eA], and ehBJ, respectively. To prove the claim, 
suppose that in the first case, group 1 does not share group 2's policy, and that in the second case • 
(1] ) or (E]) is slack. Points B correspond to such a policy, but B could not 
I 
Figure 2. Geometry of Proposition 4 Figure 1. Geometry of Proposition 3 
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be optimal since the policy B' satisfies the same constraints with lower payments to group 1. To 
see that (PI) is slack, suppose to the contrary that it binds at the optimal policy, at points B". If 
this were true, group 2's policy would have to lie on or below the curve u~ to satisfy (/1) (group 
1 cannot prefer group 2' s policy), but these policies are not feasible since they do not satisfy (P2). 
To summarize, if N is more productive at the margin for group 2, separate policies are 
needed only if N/ < N2 *. In this case, optimal policies are A * and B* in Figure 2(b), group 2 
producers will be indifferent between participating and having no program, and the program will 
make group 1 producers strictly better off. 
An Application to Corn Production in New York 
This model is applied to production of com silage in central New York, the two groups of 
producers having soils (in hydrologic groups A or B) with different yield and nitrogen leaching 
potential. Distributions of yields, nitrate contamination, and net returns are simulated using corn 
equivalent and fertilizer prices (1992 dollars) and weather data for 30 years, beginning 1963. 
Silage yields (tons/acre) for the groups (f,o) depend on nitrogen application in lbs.lacre (N) 
and growing season rainfall in inches (W), growing degree days (G) and a dummy variable for 
soils, and were estimated from 66 observations of field trial data; R2 = 0.72 (t-ratios): 
f = 16.32 - 5.15DB+ .096N - .0003N2 + .0001 DsN2 + 1.56W - 1.49 DBW + .0066G - .0018WN 
(10.1)	 (-3.2) (6.3) (-4.4) (1.2) (5.5) (-5.3) (3.2) (-1.5) 
The sum ofleaching (NL) and runoff (NR) are from (Boisvert et al.) (R2,s, .51 and .49): 
In (NR) = - 4.576 - .453DA - .359DB + .628 In (N) + .652 In w 
(-23.1) (-22.1) (7.1) (15.3) 
In (NL) =- 43.042 + 2.90DA - 6.739 In (NR) + 2.119 (In NR)2 + 4.824 In (N) + 5.768 In w 
(2.8) (-4.4) (1.8) (4.8) (9.3)	 ­
8 
For simplicity, except for nitrogen (N) rainfall (w), and the dummies for soils, the effects of five 
soil characteristics, and other rain variables at mean levels are incorporated into the constants. 
For the policy experiment, farmers in both groups are assumed to have negative
 
exponential utility functions, and receive payments to reduce N rates so that combined nitrate
 
leaching and runoff exceeds 40 and 20 Ibs.lacre with no more than a 10% probability. Initial
 
fertilization rates are determined by solving equation (3); optimal payments are determined by
 
solving the design problem in equation (5). Payments under symmetric information are found by
 
solving (5) without the self selection conditions (h), since the government knows each producer's
 
group. Risk neutrality is compared with risk averse cases; the Arrow-Pratt coefficients are 0.01
 
and 0.03, consistent with empirical evidence (Buccola, 1982 and Love and Buccola, 1991).
 
The results are in Table 1. For risk neutral producers, pre-policy N rates are about 30 Ibs
 
higher for group 2 than for group 1, but implied nitrate contamination safety levels are somewhat
 
Table 1. Yield, Net Returns, and Nitrogen Fertilizer Levels by Group and Level of Risk Aversion 
Group 1 Group 2 
Risk Safety N- Meanc Green Paymentsd N- Meanc Green Paymentsd 
Coefficiene Level Level Net Return Asymm. Symm. Level Net Return Asymm. Symm. 
0.00 61/57b 12ge $188 $0 $0 160e $121 $0 $0 
0.00 40 99 184 8 4 128 118 4 4 
0.00 20 63 165 37 24 80 96 25 25 
0.01 66/54b 133e 188 0 0 156e 121 0 0 
0.01 40 99 184 8 5 128 118 3 3 
0.01 20 63 165 34 26 80 96 22 22 
0.03 68/50b 135e 188 0 0 150e 121 0 0 
0.03 40 99 184 7 6 128 118 2 2 
• 
0.03 20 63 165 29 26 80 96 17 17 
a Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion Coefficient. b Implied nitrate contamination safety level, groupl/group2. 
C Excludes green payments.d Payments under asymmetric and symmetic information.e Pre-policy optimal levels. 
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lower, meaning that the level of environmental quality is somewhat higher. Interestingly, based 
on the estimated yield equations, nitrogen is a risk reducing input for group 1, and a risk 
increasing input for group 2; consequently, optimal pre-policy nitrogen levels increase with the 
level of risk aversion for group 1, but decrease for group 2. The reverse is true for the implied 
pre-policy nitrate contamination levels. 
Following directly from Condition 1 (at the margin nitrogen is more productive for group 
2 than for group 1) and Proposition 4 (N] * < N2 *), separate policies are needed for the two 
groups. Optimal green payments decrease with the level of risk aversion; to meet environmental 
standards group 2's reduction in N (and expected utility) decreases as farmers become more risk 
averse. Furthermore, the payments exactly restore the pre-policy expected utility levels for group 
2 (P2 binds), but in the asymmetric information case, group I producers, those with the highest 
pre-policy nitrate contamination levels, receive a windfall and are strictly better off (p] is slack). 
In the risk neutral case and the most strict environmental standard, payments to group 1 
producers are almost 55% above what would be needed if information were symmetric. The 
differential (and thus the value of information on which producers are in each group) drops to 
about 12 % for the most risk averse case. 
Perhaps one of the most striking results is that the cost, in terms of forgone farm income 
or green payments, needed to achieve a significant reduction in nitrate contamination (down to a 
40 lbs. per acre safety level) is relatively low, at most $8 per acre for both groups and risk 
aversion levels. In the case of group 1 producers, the nitrate contamination is reduced by more 
that a third. The next incremental improvement in environmental quality is at significantly 
-

higher cost to the government. Payments are as high as $37 per acre for group 1 producers. 
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Policy Implications 
In this paper, we develop a general theory of incentive based environmental policy tools 
which recognize price and yield risk and are based on a standards approach to policy in the form 
of a chance constraint on environmental damage. In applying this theory to a system of green 
payments to cut nitrogen fertilizer application to achieve voluntary reductions in nitrate 
contamination, the conditions under which separate policies are needed depends only on the 
relative productivity of fertilizer and the pollution potential of the different soils, and not on the 
farmer's level of risk aversion. The size of the payments needed, of course, does depend on the 
level of risk aversion. 
In our application, the group of producers which can satisfy environmental standards with 
higher fertilization rates (group 2) has a larger net returns response from changes in nitrogen 
fertilizer, implying that separate policies must be offered. Under asymmetric information, group 
1 benefits from the program while group 2 does not. If information were symmetric between 
producers and the government, optimal payments to group 1 would decrease so that producers in 
this group are indifferent between their pre- and post-policy situations. 
In our New York case, if farmers are indeed risk averse but are assumed risk neutral, 
payments would be set higher than necessary; the magnitude of government cost thus depends on 
risk attitudes. Further, group 1, whose payments are substantially above those under assumptions 
of symmetric information, control only about one-tenth of the total resource base, but that would 
not be true in regions such as the Midwest (Thomas and Boisvert, 1995). Therefore, in some 
other regions, the implications of information asymmetry for total government costs may be even 
-

more sustantial, and the size of the payment differential is a good indication of the value of 
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collecting infonnation needed to classify fanns for policy design purposes. The value of this 
infonnation must be weighted against the cost of collecting it. 
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1: To show property (a), the Hessian matrix of ui must be 
-i -i 
. UNN
negative definite: u~ < 0, u;s < 0, and -i ~s = U~NU;S - U;NU~S > 0, i = 1,2. 
USN uss 
Using the definition of ui from equation (2), the corresponding derivatives w.r. t. Nand 5 are: 
-i 1 f "fR i (N) 5) d -i -i 1 f "fR i (N) 5 )Ri (N )uss =- £.Ju i \ I i + i ,an uNS = USN =- £.JU i \ 1 i + i IN i' TI~ T,~ 
RilNN = 2nd derivative of Ril W.r.t. N. In the expression for U~N ,the first term in the sum is 
i
negative because ut<0; the second tenn is negative since u/>O and RilNN <0 (R INN =p/NN < 0). 
Thus, U~N <0, and u;s <0. To check the remaining condition, we must detennine the sign of: 
1 TTl T T ~ { "[R i ]2 'Ri}~" ~ "R i ~ "R i 
-2 £.J Uil IN +Uil INN £.J Uil - -2£.J Uil IN £.J Uil IN' 
T 1=1 1=1 T I=! I=! 
i
where u:r is the derivative of Ui evaluated at (R l +5i ). This expression can be rewritten: 
-
T T T T 
(AI) = LLu;:UrrR:NN + LLu:r'u::R:N[R~ ~R~N]' 
I=! s=! 1=1 $=1 
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The first sum is positive since U/'<0, u/>O and RitNN <0. The second sum can be separated into 
terms where t=s and where f:t:.s. The terms where t=s will equal zero since [Rim - RisNJ = O. For 
the remaining terms, note that any two years k:t=l will appear in the sum exactly twice. That is, 
T 
~~ ""Ri [R i R i ] " "R i [R i Ri ] " "R j [R i R i ]",-,,,,-,UitUis IN IN - sN =... + UikUa kN kN - IN + ... +UikUa IN IN - kN +- .. 
1=1 #1 
Combining these two terms, 
since u/,<O. Each pairwise combination is positive; the sum is also. Thus, (AI) > 0, completing 
the proof of property (a). To prove property (b), take expectations of It from equation (2): 
TE[ui(Ri(Nj,W,p,r)+S;)J j • • • 
= =E[ui(R (NpW,p,r)+S;)J smce obs. (Wt,Pt,rt) are Ll.d., Q.E.D. 
T 
. . ay 2(N,W) a/(N,W)
Proofof PropOSitIOn 2: Suppose aN > aN . Multiplying by Pt and subtracting rt, 
ai(N,~) ay1(N,~) 2 1 S .PI - "r > PI - "r, (e.g. for any N, R tN - R tN >0). ummmg across years: 
aN aN 
T T T T T T 
L R~ - LRft, > 0 , and L L R~ - L L R~ > O. 
1=1 1=1 s=1 1=1 s=1 1=1 
Interchanging the roles of s and t in the first sum, and reversing the order of summation, we have: 
T T T T T T 
LLR;N - LLRft, > 0 ~ LL[R;N -Rft,] > O. Since u/>O, we have the desired result: 
1=1 s=1 1=1 s=1 1=1 s=1 
T T 
LLu;(R; +S)u;(R; +S)[R;N -Rft,J > O. 
1=1 s=1 
• 
13
 
References 
Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates. The Theory of Environmental Policy, Second Edition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Boisvert, R., A. Regmi, and T. Schmit. "Econometric Relationships for Estimating and Ranking 
Distributions of Nitrate Leaching from Com Production", WP 95-04, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1995. 
Buccola, S. "Portfolio Selection Under Exponential and Quadratic Utility." Western Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 7(1982):43-51. 
Collender, R.N. and J.A. Chalfant. "An Alternative Approach to Decisions under Uncertainty 
Using the Empirical Moment-Generating Function." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 68(1986):727-731. 
Helfand, G.E. and B.W. House. "Regulating Nonpoint Source Pollution Under Heterogeneous
 
Conditions." American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 77(1995): 1024-1032.
 
Lichtenberg, E. and D. Zi1berman. "Efficient Regulation of Environmental Health Risks",
 
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 103(1988): 167-178. 
Love, A. and S.T. Buccola. "Joint Risk Preference-Technology Estimation with a Primal 
System." American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 73(1991):765-774 
Wu, J. and B. Babcock. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under 
Asymmetric Information." Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
20(1995):316-327. 
• 
14
 
Thomas, A.C. and R.N. Boisvert. "The Bioeconomics of Regulating Nitrates in Groundwater 
from Agricultural Production through Taxes, Quantity Restrictions, and Pollution 
Permits." R.B. 96-06, Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1995. 
Zhu, M., D. Taylor, S. Sarin and R. Kramer. "Chance Constrained Programming Models for 
Risk-Based Economic and Policy Analysis of Soil Conservation", Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Review, (1994):58-65. 
.. .
 
No. 96-14 
No. 96-15 
No. 
No. 
96-16 
96-17 
No. 
No. 
96-18 
96-19 
• 
No. 
No. 
96-20 
96-21 
OTHER A.R.M.E. WORKING PAPERS 
A Unique Measure of the Welfare 
Effects of Price Support Programs 
for Corn on Family-Farm Households 
by Size Distribution 
Economies of Size in Water 
Treatment vs. Diseconomies of 
Dispersion for Small Public Water 
Systems 
Developing a Demand Revealing 
Market Criterion for Contingent 
Valuation Validity Tests 
The G-3 Free Trade Agreement: 
Member Countries' Agricultural 
Policies and its Agricultural 
Provisions 
The G-3 Free Trade Agreement: A 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment 
Penn State - Cornell Integrated 
Assessment Model 
The Impact of Economic Development 
on Redistributive and Public 
Research Policies in Agriculture 
Policy Implications of Ranking 
Distributions of Nitrate Runoff and 
Leaching by Farm, Region, and Soil 
Productivity 
Tebogo B. Seleka 
Harry de Gorter 
Richard N. Boisvert 
Todd M. Schmit 
Daniel Rondeau 
Gregory L. Poe 
William D. Schulze 
Ricardo Arguello 
Steven Kyle 
Ricardo Arguello 
Steven Kyle 
Eric J. Barron 
Duane Chapman 
James F. Kasting 
Neha Khanna 
Adam Z. Rose 
Peter A. Schultz 
Harry de Gorter 
Johan F. M. Swinnen 
Richard N. Boisvert 
Anita Regmi 
Todd M. Schmit 
• 
